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Recent Cases
WORK.W'S COMPENSATION -

JUDICIAL REVmw -

FINAL ODlm - The

claimant filed an application with the workmen's compensation board,
and the case was given to a referee for findings. The referee issued
an order dismissing the claim, subject to the right of the claimant to
reopen the case for the purpose of proving jurisdiction. The claimant
filed a motion to reopen with the board, but it was overruled on the
ground that the case had been decided by the referee's order. The
claimant then appealed to the circuit court, which took jurisdiction of
the case and remanded it to the board with directions to reopen.
Held: Reversed. A ruling on a motion to reopen is not a final order
where the board has not yet approved the award of the referee. Since
there was no final order, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction for the
appeal. Creech v. Roberts, 862 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1962).
According to the statutory procedure, if the initial findings were
not made by the full board, the board must make a final award or
order upon application of a party.1 Appeal must be taken to the
circuit court within twenty days of such final order 2 It is established
case law that, under these provisions, the order of the referee is not a
final, appealable order.3 The court in the principal case treated this
precedent as controlling of the issue before it.4 However, it should be
pointed out that there was no motion to reopen in these cases. 5
The principal case well illustrates the undesirability of rigid
adherence to procedural technicalities in workmen's compensation
cases. The referee has made his dismissal of the claim expressly subject to the right to reopen to prove jurisdiction. Consequently, an
attempt by the board to affirm his disposition summarily, while ignoring his proviso, would probably constitute reversible error. The circuit court treated the cryptic ruling of the board as a final order,
1

Rev. Stat. § 342.280(1) (1963).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(1) (1963).
3 Epling v. Ratliff, 364 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1963); Kabai v. Majestic Collieries
Co., 286 Ky. 279, 150 S.W.2d 898 (1941); Spencer v. Chavies Coal Co., 280 Ky.
152, 132 S.W.2d 746 (1939). The Epling case was decided after the principal
case in the same term, while the Kabai and Spencer cases anteceded and were
relied on by the principal case.
4 Creech v. Roberts, 362 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Ky. 1962).
5 It should also be pointed out that a motion to reopen has a different meaning
when there has already been an award and the purpose of the motion is to
establish grounds for modifying the award. In that instance, the denial of the
motion is a refusal to exercise further jurisdiction, while in the principal case
there is the possibility of further action by the board. See Paul v. Allender
Brown Co., 249 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1952).
2 Ky.
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since it indicated the clear intention of the board summarily to dismiss the claim, and held the action of the board to be erroneous. The
court of appeals, on the other hand, has looked at the technical form
of the board's action and has invalidated the action taken by the
circuit court. The net effect is that the board must now go through
the formality of issuing a final order which on appeal will be invalidated.
The interval between the initial assignment to the referee and the
decision of the court of appeals was three years.6 A similar time
lapse presumably is now attending the review of the erroneous final
order. Still another period of delay very likely will accompany the
ultimate review on the merits. It is submitted that substantive treatment of the board's ruling could have reduced these detrimental
delays by one, while the technical treatment given the ruling by the
court of appeals unnecessarily postpones the possibility of recovery
by the injured workman and clutters the court docket with repetitious
review of what is essentially one issue.
T. R. Fitzgerald

ANTrTRUST LAw-APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN

ACr,

SECION ONE, TO

BANK MEac~ms.-The First National Bank and Trust Company and the
Security Trust Company, both of Lexington, Ky., after receiving
authorization from the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to the
Bank Merger Act,' consolidated 2 to form the First Security National
Bank and Trust Company. Suit based on sections one3 and two4 of
6 Creech v. Roberts, supra note 4, at 734.

112 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1960). It seems to be settled that Congress did not
intend by its enactment of the Bank Merger Act to supersede the provisions of
the Sherman Act in any respect. Approval by the Comptroller of the Currency
does not immunize the plan from attack by the Justice Department. California
v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963); United States v. First National Bank &
Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457, 458 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
2 There is a recognized distinction between "merger" and "consolidation"
as applied to corporations. In a "merger," one corporation absorbs the other but
remains in existence, while the other is dissolved. In a "consolidation" a new
corporation is created and the consolidating corporations are extinguished. Personal
Credit Plan v. Kling, 20 A.2d 704, 706 (N.J. 1941). In the Philadelphia National
Bank case, the "merger" was technically a "consolidation" and thus it is a moot
question whether the rule of law of that case covers true mergers. In the First
National Bank case, although the district court referred to the plan as a consolidation or merger, it is implicit that the plan was in fact a consolidation.
315 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). This section provides in part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal."
4 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).

